An increasing number of security incidents in cyber-physical systems (CPSs) arise from the exploitation of cyber and physical components of such systems. Knowledge about how such incidents arose is rarely captured and used systematically to enhance security and support future incident investigations. In this paper, we propose an approach to represent and share incidents knowledge. Our approach captures incident patterns -common aspects of incidents occurring in different CPSs. Our approach then allows incident patterns to be instantiated for different systems to assess if and how such patterns can manifest again. To support our approach, we provide two meta-models that represent, respectively, incident patterns and the cyber-physical systems themselves. The incident meta-model captures the characteristics of incidents, such as assets and activities. The system meta-model captures cyber and physical components and their interactions, which may be exploited during an incident. We demonstrate the feasibility of our approach in the application domain of smart buildings, by tailoring the system meta-model to represent components and interactions in this domain.
INTRODUCTION
A Cyber-Physical System (CPS) combines computation, communication, and physical processes to produce systems that are more adaptive, collaborative, and autonomous [1] . Applications of CPS [2] can be found in various domains including industrial control, transportation, and smart buildings. This combination of processes enables interactions between cyber and physical components, in which an event caused by a cyber component can have an impact on physical ones, and vice-versa. For example, in a smart building, a rise in the measured temperature of a room can trigger a digital process to issue a command to an air conditioner to start cooling the room.
Interactions between cyber and physical components are giving more opportunities to malicious individuals to cause harm [3] . For example, in the Ukrainian power grid incident [4] , offenders used spear phishing to gain a foothold in the distribution companies computer networks. Then, they gained access to the power grid network, where they infected some devices (e.g., workstations, serial-to-Ethernet) that control electricity distribution with malware. Subsequently, they disabled infected devices. This caused a disruption of the normal operation of the grid. Previously, in the German steel-mill incident [5] , offenders used spear phishing to gain a foothold in the corporate network. Then, they gained access to the plant's network, where they infected programmable logic controllers with malware. Subsequently, they caused damage to various components such as the blast furnace and the alarm system. Consequently, the normal operation of the plant was interrupted.
Incidents often have similar characteristics. For example, in the Ukrainian power grid and the German steel-mill incidents, an offender infiltrated into a private network using spear phishing. Although commonalities between these incidents can be observed, these have not been captured and used systematically to enhance security and support incident investigations [6] . Current attack modeling techniques (e.g., attack graphs [7] ) focus on representing how a traditional cyber attack (e.g., denial of service) can occur. As these techniques do not account for the interactions between cyber and physical components, they are not suitable to represent cyber-physical incidents [8] . Moreover, they focus on representing the actions of an attack, while underrepresenting other characteristics such as resources and intent, which can be useful in a digital forensic investigation. Other work [9] focuses on modeling specific attacks (e.g., switching attacks) that can occur in certain application domains, such as smart grids. Thus, this modeling technique cannot be applied to represent different types of attacks that can also happen in other application domains. Moreover, resources for capturing and sharing incidents commonalities, such as the Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) catalog [10] , only focus on cyber attacks. Incident knowledge is represented using natural language, making it difficult to use the CAPEC catalog in an automated fashion.
In this paper, we propose an approach to represent and share incident knowledge. Our approach captures incident patternscommon aspects of incidents occurring in different CPSs. Our approach then allows incident patterns to be instantiated for different systems to assess if and how such patterns can manifest again. To support our technique, we provide two meta-models to represent, respectively, incident patterns and cyber-physical systems themselves. The incident pattern meta-model captures CPS incidents characteristics, such as activities, assets, actors, resources, goals, and motives. The system meta-model captures cyber and physical components and their interactions, which may be exploited during an incident. We demonstrate the feasibility of our approach using smart buildings as an application domain, by tailoring the system meta-model to represent components and interactions in this domain. Our ultimate objective is to use knowledge of previous incidents to enhance security, for example, by enabling security measures to prevent incidents conforming to some of the discovered patterns. Incident knowledge can also be leveraged to improve forensic readiness in CPSs [11] . For example, it is possible to identify data proactively that may be relevant to an incident (i.e. potential evidence) in order to support future digital investigations. Identifying potential evidence is considered a challenge and the first step towards forensic readiness [12] .
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss a motivating example for sharing incidents knowledge among different smart buildings. In Section 3 we describe our approach. In Sections 4 and 5 we illustrate, respectively, the cyber-physical system meta-model and the incident pattern meta-model. In Section 6 we apply our approach to our example. Finally, in Section 7 we conclude and discuss future work.
MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
We present an example to motivate why representing and sharing knowledge about incidents in cyber-physical systems is important. As depicted in Fig. 1 One day the security administrators of the ACME Company discovered that an incident occurred in the Research Center. An offender reached the 2 nd floor, entered the Toilet, and connected to the smart light (SL) using a laptop. After that, s/he obtained access to the internal IP Network and was able to eavesdrop data transmitted over the network (e.g., data exchanged between the Workstation and the Servers). The incident actions are listed at the bottom of Fig. 1 .
Upon the discovery of the incident, security administrators wrote a report describing how the incident occurred. They needed to assess whether similar incidents can take place also in the other smart buildings and in what ways. This would allow security administrators to enhance security in the smart buildings because they can enact security measures able to prevent similar incidents from happening. Moreover, this would allow identifying data indicating that similar incidents are occurring in the smart buildings. Monitoring this data proactively can support investigating these incidents, shall they occur.
To assess whether similar incidents characteristics can manifest also in the other buildings, security administrators have to examine the physical structure of each building, as well as the software and network configurations of the digital devices within the buildings in order to identify existing vulnerabilities brought by cyber and physical components. Consequently, data related to these actions might not be collected and stored proactively, hence, any future investigations of similar incidents might be more difficult because some relevant evidence is missing. Moreover, identifying vulnerabilities in a system can be difficult, since a system as a smart building can contain several hundreds of components with various vulnerabilities that can be exploited [13] . Some vulnerabilities can be thus overlooked due to human errors. x Are available resources sufficient? Current resources such as the Common Vulnerabilities & Exposures (CVE) dictionary [14] focus on cybersecurity vulnerabilities, which are used to assess cybersecurity of a system. However, for incidents in cyber-physical systems, this is not sufficient due to the interactions between cyber and physical components that are often exploited (e.g., physical reachability to smart light to connect to the digital network) [15] . Moreover, to support digital investigations, it is also necessary to represent other incident characteristics, such as actors, resources adopted and assets targeted by an action. These characteristics have been neglected in existing incident representations. To address the aforementioned challenges, we introduce our approach in the next section.
REPRESENTING & SHARING INCIDENTS KNOWLEDGE
Our approach aims to share incident knowledge across different cyber-physical systems. Incident knowledge is represented as incident patterns indicating common characteristics, such as activities, assets, resources, locations, and motives, among incidents that occurred in different systems. As shown in Fig. 2 , our approach includes two main activities: 1) Incident Pattern Extraction and 2) Incident Pattern Instantiation. During incident patterns extraction, patterns are identified from incidents that occurred and are then stored in an Incident Pattern Repository shared across different systems. In our incident example, the actions "enter Toilet" and "connect to Internal IP Network using SL" can be expressed in a more abstract form into an incident pattern such as "enter Location" and "connect to IP network" activities. A Visitor who is inside the Location can perform both activities and can exploit a co-located SmartDevice to connect to the IP network. The extracted pattern can then be added to the repository. During incident patterns instantiation, patterns are mapped to different systems to identify potential incident instances i.e. to identify whether and how such patterns can manifest again. For example, the extracted pattern, shown in Fig.  2 , can be instantiated to the Warehouse, the Research Center and the Manufacturing Plant. In the Warehouse, the pattern activities can be mapped, for example, to the actions "enter Office1" and "connect to IP network using Fire Alarm". In the Manufacturing Plant, the pattern activities can be mapped to the actions "enter Office2" and "connect to Internal IP Network using Workstation". The Incident Pattern Extraction activity is carried out as illustrated in Fig. 3 . First, a security administrator models the incident that occurred. Incident modeling requires, as input, a system representation that specifies the system components and their potential interactions. In addition, incident modeling is assisted by an incident pattern meta-model and a system metamodel, which act as templates. The two meta-models are discussed later in the paper. Subsequently, the Pattern Extraction activity extracts a pattern from the incident model. This activity is assisted by the incident pattern meta-model and the system metamodel, which can be used to identify possible levels of abstractions that could be used to make the actions and the incident characteristics more general and re-usable across different systems. Several incident patterns with different levels of abstraction may be extracted, which can then be reviewed by a security administrator. Afterwards, the extracted pattern is sent to the repository and could be merged with other existing patterns, if necessary.
Furthermore, Fig. 3 shows the Incident Pattern Instantiation activity, which is executed as follows. During Pattern Mapping, an incident pattern is fetched from the repository and then mapped against a system representation to identify potential incident instances. Subsequently, during Security & Forensic Readiness Analysis, incident instances are analyzed to determine which security and forensic readiness measures should be applied to, respectively, prevent and investigate generated incident instances. Security measures can prevent some actions in the generated incident instances from occurring, while forensic readiness measures can identify incident-relevant data that should be collected proactively because they may constitute an evidence during future digital investigations.
REPRESENTING CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS
We describe a meta-model to represent cyber and physical components and their interactions. We tailor our system metamodel to represent smart buildings as an application area of CPS since we have a research interest in it. A simplified version of the smart building meta-model is shown in Fig. 4 ComputingDevices (e.g., Fire Alarm and HVAC) can be defined with the type wired. The meta-model also includes the entity Action, which specifies the dynamics of a system. For example, the Research Center can include actions such as "enter a Room" and "connect to a ComputingDevice". An Action may have a precondition and postcondition that describe, respectively, the required system state before the action is performed and the system state after the action is performed. For example, the precondition of action "enter a Room" is that the Actor performing the action is inside a Room that is physically connected to the Room to be accessed, for example, through a door. Although not addressed here, contextual constraints over entities' properties and actions could also be represented as state properties of an entity, such as Context. For example, a contextual constraint named WorkingHours can be attached to action "enter a Room", which indicates that accessing a room is permitted only during working hours. The postcondition of action "enter a Room" is that the accessed Room contains the Actor who performed the action.
The meta-model was implemented as an Eclipse plugin that is publicly available 1 .
1 https://tinyurl.com/yb2kkuvl Figure 4 Smart building meta-model (simplified).
REPRESENTING INCIDENT PATTERNS
We represent incident patterns using a meta-model that is based on the concept of crime script [16] . A crime script is used in criminology to describe the sequence of activities of a physical incident in order to improve the understanding of the incidentcommission process and the identification of incident prevention techniques [17] . However, there is a lack of a unified model to represent the entities and relationships found in a crime script. Moreover, crime scripts focus on physical incidents only, while neglecting cyber incidents and cyber-physical incidents. Our meta-model captures the primary and secondary entities found in crime scripts. Primary entities are those represented in all crime script models published in the literature, while secondary entities are those mentioned, implicitly or explicitly, in most of the models published in the literature [17] [18] . The meta-model also includes additional entities such as DigitalAsset to represent cyber components. A simplified version of the meta-model is shown in Fig. 5 . The meta-model was implemented as an Eclipse plugin that is publicly available 2 . Fig. 5 shows the incident pattern meta-model. A primary entity is the crime script itself; it is characterized by a name and a description. CrimeScript entity includes a set of Scenes, which are the phases in which certain activities take place (e.g., preparation scene). Each scene, in turn, includes a set of activities that an entity performs during the incident. An Activity is characterized by a name, a precondition that represents the system state required to perform the activity, and a postcondition that represents the system state after executing the activity. An Activity also defines, as relations, its nextActivities, and previousActivities. An Activity 2 https://tinyurl.com/y796ouyq corresponds to an Action entity in the system meta-model. The pre-/post-conditions of an Activity can be abstracted from the pre-/post-conditions of Action(s) defined in a system representation. For example, the Action "enter Toilet" can be abstracted to the Activity "enter Room". Secondary entities are used to relate an activity to the entity performing it (e.g., victim or offender). Additional entities, such as Asset, Resource, and Location can better characterize an activity.
In the incident pattern meta-model, an Asset is an entity that can be harmed during an incident. The status of an Asset can be defined as an attribute. For example, a Workstation defined as an Asset can have on/off as status. An Asset can be further extended by the entities DigitalAsset and PhysicalAsset. An Asset can have a direct mapping to the Asset entity presented in the system metamodel. As shown in the previous section, Assets can be further extended in the system meta-model to represent more concrete entities such as Room and ComputingDevice.
An Actor represents a group or an individual who performs an activity and can be an Offender or a Victim. A Resource represents a tool needed to perform an activity. PhysicalResource refers to a physical tool used by an offender in an incident (e.g., laptop). DigitalResource represents a software tool that an offender can use to perform certain activities in an incident (e.g., malware). An Actor and a Resource could be extended by entities Actor and Asset represented in the system meta-model. A Location represents a place where an activity or a sequence of activities of a scene is performed. Location in the meta-model is an interface that is implemented by Asset, Resource, and Actor. A location can be physical or digital. A PhysicalLocation represents a place in the physical space (e.g., a room) where an activity or a sequence of activities takes place. A digital location represents a place in the cyberspace such as an IP address or a digital folder. For each Location, contained locations can be defined via the relation cotnainedLocations, and also its parent location via the relation parentLocation.
Connections can be defined between a Location and other entities (e.g., digital connection between two Workstations). A Connection has a direct mapping to a more concrete Connection entity that is defined in the system meta-model. For example, a DigitalConnection in an incident pattern can be an abstraction of a more concrete Connection (e.g., WiFiConnection) defined in a system representation. The ActivityInitiator is an interface that defines the entity that performs an activity. ActivityInitiator is implemented by entities Actor, Asset, and Resource. This implies that our meta-model allows, not only an Actor to perform activities, but also Asset and Resource. For example, an activity may be performed by a malware, which can be considered as a Resource.
The incident pattern meta-model has the potential to provide a systematic and rich representation of incidents since it encompasses not only the activities of an incident but also related entities and relationships (e.g., location, assets, and actors). Moreover, the possibility to extend the meta-model entities with domain-specific entities identified from a system representation makes our meta-model extensible and general enough to be applied to different types of systems.
Figure 5 Incident pattern meta-model (simplified).
Fig . 6 shows the incident pattern extracted from the incident example described in Section 2. Action "enter Toilet" can be abstracted to the activity "enter Target_Location" and is performed by a Visitor. A precondition for this activity is that the Target Location should be a Room that contains a SmartDevice connected to a DigitalAsset of type IP_Network. A postcondition for the activity is that Target Location contains Visitor.
Actions "connect physically to SL" and "connect digitally to internal IP network", can be abstracted to activity the "connect to IP_Network". This activity is associated with entities Room, IP_Network, and Laptop. A precondition for this activity is that the Visitor contains Laptop i.e. the visitor carries a laptop. This activity requires activity "enter Target_Location" to have occurred, and results in the creation of a new connection between the Laptop and the IP_Network.
To further illustrate the mapping from an incident to a pattern, we suggest the following guidelines. The first aspect to determine is what sequence of actions can be mapped to a single activity. This depends on how closely related are these actions, for example, whether they share many of their entities and relations.
Second aspect to consider is identifying entities in an incident that need to be extracted. Each entity associated with an action can be used, targeted, exploited, initiator, or can denote a location. Determining the role of an entity in an action can determine the entity type to use from the incident pattern meta-model. For example, the action "enter Toilet" has the entities Visitor, which represents the ActivityInitiator as an Actor, and Toilet which represents a PhysicalAsset that is a targeted Location. The relationship between the Visitor and the Toilet is that the Toilet should contain the Visitor after executing the action.
Third aspect is to determine what level of abstraction and properties is appropriate for the pattern. This will heavily depend on the level of details needed. In our approach, we use a system meta-model to determine possible abstraction levels. For example, in the system meta-model, a SmartLight can be abstracted to ComputingDevice, PhysicalAsset, and Asset, ranging from the least abstract to the most abstract entity. When a more abstract entity is adopted (e.g., PhysicalAsset) the incident pattern can be applied to a wider set of systems compared to when a more specific entity is considered such as SmartLight. The choice of a suitable level of abstraction requires the intervention of a security administrator. For example, if the objective is to investigate ways in which a computing device (smart light or other) can be exploited to connect to a network, then using SmartLight will not be sufficient, so ComputingDevice would be a more suitable abstraction.
Finally, a sequence of actions of an incident may be abstracted by reusing existing activities of incident patterns that have already been stored in the repository. For example, if an offender exploited the fire alarm in an office to gain access to an internal IP network, an incident pattern could be created using activities "enter Location" then "connect to IP network using DigitalAsset". These activities can be mapped to the actions of the incident that occurred in the research center.
USING INCIDENT PATTERNS
In this section, we demonstrate how our approach uses incident patterns to assess how such patterns can manifest in the other smart buildings i.e. the Warehouse and the Manufacturing Plant.
As shown at the bottom of Fig. 7 , the Warehouse has three rooms (Office1, Office2, and Toilet), and a Storage Area. Office1 contains a Fire Alarm and a Smart Light (SL1). Office2 contains a Smart Light (SL2). The Toilet contains a Smart Light (SL3). Fire Alarm, SL1, and SL2 are connected to the Internal IP Network. Based on this building configuration, the incident pattern can be mapped to 3 potential incident instances as shown in Fig. 7 . Activity "enter Target_Location" can be mapped to actions "enter Office1" or "enter Office2". This is because both offices contain smart devices (e.g., Fire Alarm, SL2) that are in turn connected to the Internal IP Network. This satisfies the precondition of activity "enter Target_Location" requiring that the entered room contains a SmartDevice connected to DigitalAsset of type IP_Network. "enter Toilet" is not a possible action since SL3 in the Toilet is not connected to the Internal IP Network, hence, it does not satisfy the activity precondition. The next activity "connect to IP_Network" can be mapped to six different actions that depend on which smart device is exploited i.e. SL1, SL2, or Fire Alarm. For example, if the Visitor is in Office1, then the activity may be mapped to the two actions "connect physically to SL1" and "connect to Internal IP Network". Similar actions can be identified for the Fire Alarm and SL2. The final activity "collect data" can be mapped to one action "eavesdrop" in this case, however, more actions can be chained to satisfy the activity if more details are provided, such as what type of data can be eavesdropped from the IP network.
A similar approach can be adopted to map the incident pattern to the representation of the Manufacturing Plant shown at the bottom of Fig. 8 Fig. 8 . Activity "enter Target_Location" is mapped to action "enter Office1", since it satisfies the precondition of the activity. The action "enter Materials Room" is not a possible action since none of the devices in the Materials Room are connected to the Internal IP Network. Assuming that the Visitor is in Office1, activity "connect to IP_Network" can be mapped to action "connect to Internal IP Network using Workstation". Finally, the activity "collect data" can be mapped to the action "eavesdrop".
Different configurations of the cyber and physical components in smart buildings may lead to different manifestations of the same incident pattern, as shown earlier. These manifestations can be further reasoned about to identify adequate measures to improve security and forensic readiness of a system. For example, a security measure for the Warehouse is to ensure that smart devices are firmly installed to prevent physical manipulation.
RELATED WORK
The literature shows little work has been done to represent and share incidents knowledge in cyber-physical systems. Current Attack Modeling Techniques (e.g., attack graphs [7] ) focus on representing how a traditional cyber-attack (e.g., denial of service attack) can occur. Resources available are also focusing on sharing information about cyber attacks.
A close work representing CPS incidents is proposed by Hawrylak et al. [19] . In this work, the authors develop Hybrid Attack Graph (HAG) to model cyber-physical attacks. HAG is a formalism that produces a graph of all possible ways a set of exploit patterns can be applied to a system. However, the approach focuses on representing malicious actions that exploit vulnerabilities found in some devices and does not consider other non-malicious interactions between cyber and physical components that can lead to undesired state. Additionally, the work focuses on representing actions, while neglecting other incident characteristics (e.g., intent, resources) that can be useful during digital forensic investigations. Chen et al. [20] use Petri nets as a modeling formalism to represent cyber-physical attacks on a smart grid. The approach represents concurrent physical and digital events to represent coordinated attacks performed by multiple attackers working in parallel. For example, an offender hacks the access control system [digital event], while another enters a prohibited location [physical event]. However, this approach still focuses on events and does not explicitly model other aspects of an incident that can be relevant for an investigation such as actors, and assets.
Yampolskiy et al. [8] propose a cyber-physical attack description language (CP-ADL) that is based on a six-dimensional taxonomy of attacks on CPS. In their work, an incident is represented as a causal chain, which contains a set of atomic attacks. An atomic attack consists of a set of actions (includes attack means, and preconditions), cause (includes attack element, and changes), and effect (includes influenced element and impact on it). However, their approach does not consider other aspects of incidents such as locations of elements. Clausing et al. [21] provide a general attack modeling approach for industrial facilities. Their approach is based on designing a shared architecture view for Industrial Control Systems (ICS), which consists of several elements: entity, interface, carrier, protocol, humans, and data. Their focus is on modeling the system components, then adding steps of an attack to it. However, the approach is specific to ICS.
Resources for sharing CPS incidents knowledge are limited. Currently, available resources provide information about cyber attacks. For example, the Common Vulnerabilities & Exposures (CVE) [14] is a publically available dictionary of known cybersecurity vulnerabilities in software and devices. Moreover, The US National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [22] is a database, based on CVE, of cybersecurity vulnerabilities that includes various metrics such as severity, impact on environment, and interactions required from users. The Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) [10] catalog provides a textual description of various attacks against "cyber-enabled capabilities". Repository of Industrial Security Incidents (RISI) [23] is a private resource that provides reports about incidents that occurred in ICS. However, both CAPEC and RISI provide information expressed in natural language about incidents. Therefore, incident information cannot be processed automatically. 
CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK
We proposed an approach to share incidents knowledge using incident patterns. Incident patterns capture commons aspects of incidents occurring in different systems. To support our approach, we provided two meta-models that represent, respectively, incident patterns and the cyber-physical systems themselves. We described a meta-model to represent components and interactions in smart buildings. We also discussed the incident pattern metamodel and gave an example of an incident pattern and some guidelines to create them. We demonstrated how our approach could be used to create an incident pattern, and map such pattern to different systems to identify how similar incidents may reoccur.
In future work, we intend to evaluate expressivity of our incident pattern meta-model by using it to represent different incidents that can occur in CPS. We will try to model synthetic incidents extracted from the literature as well as real incidents. In addition, we intend to develop a technique to automate the process of extraction of incident patterns and instantiation of such patterns to cyber-physical systems. To instantiate incident patterns, we intend to use a modeling formalism to reason about system dynamics. Bigraphical Reactive Systems (BRS) [24] are a strong candidate to reason about system dynamics since they provide reaction rules to express system evolution. BRS use Bigraphs to represent the system state. Bigraphs allow representing the configuration of cyber and physical components as well as their interactions. This eliminates constraints (e.g., limited connectivity) imposed by other formalisms such as action calculi, which are suitable to represent interactions only between physical or cyber components. Moreover, BRS have been used to reason about CPS for various applications domains such as adaptive security systems [25] . Finally, we plan to develop a technique to analyze incidents that are generated from mapping a pattern to a system. Our analysis will aim at identifying potential evidence (e.g., assets, actions), which can be collected and stored proactively for the purpose of supporting future investigations. We will apply our techniques, once developed, to several scenarios to evaluate them against some metrics such as correctness, performance and scalability.
